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FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS, there has been discussion about how cities in Canada can gain more 
authority and the freedom, powers, and resources necessary to govern their own affairs.  
The problem goes back to the time of Confederation in 1867, when eighty per cent of 
Canadians lived in rural areas. Powerful provinces were needed to unite the large, sparsely 
populated countryside, to pool resources, and to provide good government. Toronto had already 
become a city in 1834 with a democratically elected government, but its 50,000 people were only 
around three per cent of Ontario’s 1.6 million. Confederation negotiations did not even consider 
the idea of conferring governmental power to Toronto or other municipalities, dividing it instead 
solely between the soon-to-be provinces and the new central government. Those negotiations were 
concluded in the British North America Act, Section 92 of which states: 
 
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters 
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated, that is to say, 
… 
 
(8) Municipal Institutions in the Province. 
 
Thus, provinces were allocated absolute power over municipalities. Cities were left with no powers 
or authorities of their own.  
The courts have often interpreted this section strictly. As the Supreme Court of Canada 
stated in a 1993 decision summarizing the view established by previous courts, “[m]unicipalities 
are entirely the creatures of provincial statutes. Accordingly, they can exercise only those powers 
which are explicitly conferred upon them by a provincial statute.”1 
As many have noted, these arrangements are antique and inadequate to the demands placed 
on cities in the 21st century. Today, eighty per cent of Canadians live in cities. Almost one in ten 
Canadians live in Toronto. Toronto’s 3,000,000 residents elect the sixth-largest government in the 
country but have far less power over their own affairs than the 150,000 people of Prince Edward 
Island. Other large Canadian cities clearly compete with provinces for economic and social 
importance. Calgary and Edmonton, for example, represent more than fifty per cent of the 
population of Alberta. It can hardly be doubted that Canada’s cities today are mature levels of 
government in their own right, capable of handling the full range of municipal responsibilities, 
given the resources and the authority to do so.  
At different times, some Canadian cities have been allocated special powers by provincial 
legislation with good intentions. This is the case with Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta, as well 
as Toronto in Ontario. Those cities were given their own special legislation, defining new powers 
for those cities which other municipalities did not have, such as the ability to design their own 
governance structures, guaranteed fiscal frameworks and some limited powers of taxation. But 
 
 John Sewell was a member of Toronto City Council from 1969 to 1984 and was Mayor of Toronto 1979-80. He 
has engaged in politics in Toronto as a community activist, city councillor, journalist, writer, housing administrator, 
and social entrepreneur. He is a member of Chartercitytoronto.ca. 
1 R v Greenbaum [1993] 1 SCR 674. [1993] 1 SCR 674 
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these special powers have been subject to limitations. Exercising them often requires provincial 
approval in advance. The province is able to unilaterally change or repeal those powers with no 
enforceable requirement to consult the city, as both Ontario and Alberta have done in the past two 
years; Ontario with respect to Toronto and Alberta, both Edmonton, and Calgary.  
Further, many programs and services delivered by cities are cost-shared with the provincial 
government. Whenever the provincial government decides to reduce its share of funding or refuses 
to augment it to keep pace with inflation, municipal programs suffer. Since city governments 
typically have very limited powers to raise their own revenue, they are often unable to find the 
money to continue those programs and residents lose out.  
For most of Canada’s history, despite the inherent power imbalance, provinces have 
supported cities as close partners and allies. But since the late 20th century, provinces have sought 
instead to impose their will on cities.  
The example of Toronto is instructive. In 1998, the province forced Metropolitan Toronto’s 
six municipalities to amalgamate into a single mega-city over the objections of their governments, 
and of the seventy-six per cent of residents who voted against the scheme in referenda. The 
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto had been one of the most admired structures for municipal 
government in the world. The amalgamation has not been a success: its cost was estimated at about 
an extra $300 million a year, and local government became much less accessible for most residents.  
A few years later, the province downloaded many responsibilities to the city without 
adequate revenue sources, including the public housing projects owned by the province, and the 
complete funding of the public transit system which the province had contributed to for twenty-
five years. The city thus became dependent on the province for handouts in order to pay its day-
to-day expenses. 
In 2017, the city requested the power to levy tolls on inner-city expressways to raise money 
for transit operations. The province refused, instead increasing the city’s financial dependence on 
provincial transfers by substituting a (revocable) portion of the provincial gas tax. 
In 2018, the province vaporized half of City Council in the middle of the municipal election 
and took away the city’s ability to design its own forms of governance which had been guaranteed 
in the City of Toronto Act, 2006. When the city and others challenged this decision in court, the 
province threatened to rescind Torontonians’ rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by 
using the so-called “notwithstanding clause,” to universal outrage. 
In 2019, the province passed legislation permitting it to take ownership of the city’s subway 
system without compensation. It then agreed not to exercise that power if the city would agree to 
support four subway lines and extensions that the province wished to implement, even though 
those plans and additions were contrary to the city’s long-developed plans and priorities for transit.  
Also in 2019, the province rejected two critical urban plans for the city’s downtown and 
midtown, wasting years of work and consultation with city residents. Instead, the province—
unilaterally and without consultation—increased allowable densities in those areas. It rescinded 
much of the city’s power to get property developers to pay for community infrastructure and 
benefits such as parks, libraries, and childcare spaces. 
These provincial actions, and others, have left the city poorer and less able to run its own 
affairs. A city can’t succeed when its decisions are continually subject to arbitrary provincial 
override, or the fear of it. Nor can cities succeed when provincial plans are foisted upon it against 
its will, or when the city is perpetually denied the ability to raise the funds it needs.  
This power imbalance does not make Toronto a better managed or more efficient city. The 
people of Toronto have the brains, talent, ambition, and love for the city to successfully run their 
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own affairs. Like other Canadian cities, Toronto is a diverse, wealthy, fast-growing city that strives 
to be confident, inclusive, innovative, modern, and forward-looking. Toronto is a global city that 
competes internationally in such fields as culture, finance, sports, health sciences, manufacturing, 
and technology.  
The quality of life in large Canadian cities is among the highest in the world. Canadian 
cities have been ranked among the top twenty-five or thirty global cities for safety, livability, cost 
of living, business environment, democracy, and food security. On a planet of increasing global 
mobility, Canadian cities are among the best at attracting the sophisticated, educated, and 
innovative talent from around the world. Each year, for example, the Greater Toronto Area 
welcomes and settles more than 100,000 newcomers—refugees and immigrants alike—from other 
parts of the world seeking a better life.  
Cities are the economic drivers of Canada. Toronto, for example, contributes one-tenth of 
Canada’s GDP every year—about $200 billion. Cities recognize that partnerships with provinces 
and the federal government are vital to their success and they embrace their responsibility to fairly 
share their wealth with the province and the country.  
However, city taxpayers also contribute billions more tax dollars a year to the provinces 
than come back in contributions to cities’ budgets. It’s estimated that in Canada, cities typically 
keep a mere ten per cent of the taxes paid by city residents. The rest goes to senior levels of 
government. Tax money that is returned to the city from those levels of government often comes 
with strings attached that do not allow the city to spend as it thinks is best.  
Cities need new arrangements in order to succeed. They need clear jurisdiction and 
authority over city affairs. They need to control revenues sufficient to meet the city’s needs. They 
need constitutional protection from provincial interference.  
City Charters from other jurisdictions have been suggested as models from which ideas 
might be taken—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago, for example. California alone has more 
than 100 Charter Cities with dedicated municipal powers, including the broad power of taxation, 
and a high level of autonomy from state governments.  
In Canada, the process to create a charter would be as follows. The province and the city 
would agree on the powers and other arrangements to be included. The province would pass it in 
the form of provincial legislation, which the city would ratify by majority resolution. The province 
and city would then jointly request of the federal government an amendment under Section 43 of 
the Canadian Constitution, often called a “single province” or “bilateral” amendment. The 
amendment would at a minimum set out the requirement that any future changes to the City Charter 
would require the consent of the city. It might also outline the procedure by which other cities 
could achieve a City Charter. 
Finding the province and city in agreement, and assuming public support for the idea, the 
federal government would place the amendment before the House of Commons. If passed by a 
majority vote, the amendment would then go to the Senate for ratification.  
This is a simple and straightforward process that can be used by any province and any city. 
It has been used for other matters seven times in the past thirty years. The federal government has 
never declined a request from a province for a single province amendment. It would give the City 
Charter a great deal of protection and the certainty that the province could not unilaterally change 
it. 
Several objections have been raised to City Charters, and it is important that they be 
responded to.  
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The first objection is that the province may cease to care about or lose interest in urban 
issues if the city has a high level of autonomy and the province is no longer central to its decision-
making. A City Charter does not separate the city from the province, it simply augments and 
clarifies city powers, gives them certainty, and provides accountability. The city would remain 
subject to all provincial laws unless they specifically conflicted with charter provisions. It would 
also remain a fact that provinces have a constitutional obligation to municipalities. As cities will 
continue to be among the most important contributors to the economy of the province, it would be 
short-sighted to lose interest in their success. Greater equality as defined in a City Charter will in 
fact enable a new relationship between cities and the province—one not of subservience and 
control, but of partnership, based on the pursuit of mutual interests. 
Second is whether a charter will interfere with, or stand in the way of, the resolution of 
regional or metropolitan issues. Any wisely drafted charter will mention regional issues (such as 
transit, affordable housing, the natural environment, and policing) and suggest how they might be 
addressed, given the current absence of a regional decision-making body. Hopefully it will specify 
that the city will be involved directly in decision-making about these issues, since their 
involvement can help lead to effective solutions, and that the bodies overseeing these issues are 
accountable to the cities involved. 
A third objection is that it would be easier for the province to simply adopt a “manner and 
form” approach, where a charter is agreed to between the city and the province and the province 
then passes legislation restricting its ability to amend the charter by requiring, for instance, a two-
thirds vote of the legislature, or certain elements of consultation. This has apparently been used 
successfully by the British government in restraining the House of Commons. Others have 
suggested that in the Canadian tradition nothing would prevent a province from unilaterally 
breaching such limitations, as indeed occurred when the Ontario government refused to honour its 
legislative commitment in the City of Toronto Act, 2006 to consult the city before intervening in 
2018 to upset the city’s decision to create forty-seven wards. A single province amendment 
requiring explicit city consent to change the charter, and federal consent to alter the amendment 
itself, seems much more powerful. 
For the above reasons a charter secured under Section 43 of the Constitution Act seems the 
best approach.  
Why would the province agree to restrict itself by giving a City Charter powers? The 
simplest answer is that what is good for cities is good for provinces. Successful cities with 
accountable local governments are a significant asset to provinces.  
This question is answered more fully in the charter document, but briefly there are three 
good reasons. A charter ensures that the city is accountable for its actions rather than counting on 
province to “bail it out” on contentious issues and forcing provincial politicians to take the heat on 
those issues. A charter will allow the province to concentrate on matters of provincial interest, 
leaving city issues to city representatives who are much more knowledgeable about local matters. 
A charter will help sort out financial interests instead of relying on shared cost programs with 
mixed, and sometimes conflicting interests. 
The most important question is what powers and authorities a charter should include. The 
province will have its list and each city will have its list. The two parties will be required to sit 
down and sort them out. We—a group of engaged residents of Toronto—have proposed a charter 
for Toronto which includes the issues we believe the city should propose when the time comes for 
discussion about what’s included in the document. For some, the list will be too long, for others, 
too short. It is a draft, and now the subject of public discussion which we hope continues for a year 
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or more to determine what people in Toronto wish their City Council to ask from the provincial 
government in a charter.  
This draft can be a template for the thinking in other cities, both in Ontario and across 
Canada. We hope it begins a wide-ranging discussion about empowering cities. 
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Proposal Overview 
 
There’s been a lot of talk lately about empowering the city of Toronto and other big cities. 
Adopting a City Charter is often mentioned as a way to give the city the power and authority it 
needs to govern its own affairs. 
 
But what would a City Charter look like? What would be in it? What would it do for cities? This 




Charter City Toronto proposes a two-part process toward greater power and autonomy for the 
city of Toronto. We believe this can serve as a template for other cities in Ontario and Canada 
who wish to achieve greater control over their own affairs. 
 
1 City Charter 
 
The city and the province--with substantial public consultation--will create and pass a City 
Charter for Toronto. The Charter will give the city enhanced power and jurisdiction over city 
affairs. 
 
2 Constitutional Amendment 
 
The province and federal government will pass a single-province amendment to the Canadian 
Constitution that enables the creation of Charter Cities in Ontario and protects them from 
provincial interference in areas of municipal jurisdiction. 
 
This proposal is not a final set of ideas, but rather the start of   a conversation. We hope it will 
be widely discussed, massaged, amended, and changed to produce a document that has wide 
agreement. 
 
Four Key Principles 
 
This proposal makes recommendations for a City Charter to cover four key principles: 




The city of Toronto would regain the authority to determine its own governing structures. The 
province unilaterally revoked that authority in 2018. The city would have full control over: city 
council and the Mayor’s office; the city bureaucracy; agencies, boards, commissions; 
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We propose that the provincial and federal governments create and pass a single-province 
amendment to the Canadian Constitution. The amendment would define Charter Cities and end 
their status as “creatures of the province” whose every decision-- 
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and very existence--is subject to provincial override. No changes could be made to the City 




The Charter would place exclusive responsibility and authority for key municipal functions 
clearly in the hands of an empowered city government. The starting point is all the powers the 
city has now in the City of Toronto Act. Other areas for exclusive city authority would be: land 
use planning, streets, housing, local transit, human services, public health, education up to 
Grade 12 and selected powers of taxation. 
 
Where necessary, the city and province would share authority in certain areas, but with clear 
rules defining the roles and authorities of the two partners. These could include: health, 
immigrant settlement, policing and others. The city would be empowered to make 




The Charter would give the city control over (not just access to) the revenues and resources it 
needs to meet its responsibilities. It would also continue the practice of sharing the wealth 




Charter Cities are Common 
 
City Charters that give cities strong inherent powers are common in Europe and the US, with 
over a hundred in California alone. Many European cities have Charters also. 
 
Several Canadian cities have what are commonly referred to as City Charters, including 
Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Saint John and others. In each case, these Canadian 
“Charters” are provincial legislation, which can be unilaterally amended or revoked by the 
province. By contrast, we propose a constitutionally protected City Charter that can only be 
adopted or amended with the consent of the city. 
 
Single Province Amendments are also Common 
 
There have been eight such amendments since the Constitution was repatriated in 1982. Under 
Section 43 of the Constitution, single-province amendments need only the approval of the 
provincial legislature and the federal parliament. This makes them easier to achieve than 
amendments covering the country as a whole, which require the consent of at least seven 
provinces that have 50 per cent of Canada’s population. 
 
How a Charter Protects the City 
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Once the basic rules of governing a city are laid out and adopted in a City Charter, constitutional 
protection means those rules can only be changed if the city consents. 
If Toronto had a City Charter as we propose in 2018, the Ford government would not have been 
able to reduce city council and revoke Toronto’s powers of governance against the will of the 
city. Nor could the province unilaterally change the rules for amending the Charter. That would 
require the agreement of the federal parliament. 
 
No rules are fireproof, but the ones we propose would afford solid protection for the city. 
 
The Case for a City Charter 
 
Toronto has been democratically governed even before Canada was created in 1867. But at 
Confederation, provinces were allocated absolute power over municipalities. Cities were given 
no powers or authorities of their own. 
 
In 1867, 80 per cent of Canadians lived in rural areas. At that time, powerful provinces were 
needed to unite the large, sparsely populated countryside, to pool resources and to provide 
good government. 
 
Cities were an afterthought. 
 
These arrangements are antique and inadequate to the demands placed on cities in the 21st 
century. 
 
Today, 80 per cent of Canadians live in cities. 1 in 10 lives in Toronto. 1 in 5 lives in the GTA. 
 
Toronto’s 3,000,000 residents elect the sixth-largest government in the country, but have far 
less power over their own affairs than the 150,000 people of Prince Edward Island. 
 
Canada’s cities are mature levels of government in their own right, capable of handling the full 
range of municipal responsibilities, given the resources and the authority to do so. 
 
The Power Imbalance 
 
For most of our shared history, despite the inherent power imbalance, the province has 
supported cities as a close partner and ally. It recognized that Toronto’s success meant success 
for the province and the country. But since the late 20th century, provinces have sought instead 
to impose their will on cities and on the city of Toronto in particular: 
 
Ontario forced the amalgamation of Toronto’s six municipalities into a mega-city over the 
objections of the city government and citizens in a referendum. This has been recognized by 
most as a major mistake for which the city is still paying. Over many years, the province has 
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downloaded responsibilities to the city without adequate revenue sources, leaving the city 
dependent on the province for handouts in order to pay its day-to-day bills. 
 
The city was made more dependent on and more vulnerable to the province when it vetoed the 
city’s decision to toll inner-city expressways in order to raise money for transit. 
 
The province vaporized half of City Council in the middle of an election and took away the city’s 
ability to design its own forms of governance. It threatened to rescind Torontonians’ rights 
under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in order to do achieve the cuts. The city, powerless 
under the Canadian constitution, could do nothing to stop it. 
 
The province took control of decision-making over Toronto’s local transit projects and 
threatened to take ownership of the city’s subways. It threw out two critical urban plans for the 
city’s downtown and midtown, wasting years of work and consultations with city residents. It 
rescinded the city’s power to get property developers to pay for community infrastructure  and 
benefits such as parks, libraries and child care spaces from property developers. 
 
All of these provincial actions, and others, have left the city poorer and less able to run its own 
affairs. A city can’t succeed when its decisions are continually subject to arbitrary provincial 
override. Or when provincial plans are foisted upon the city without consultation or notice. Or 
when the city is perpetually denied the ability to raise the funds it needs. 
 
By giving the city more control over its own affairs through a City Charter, and by giving the city 
a veto over any changes to the Charter, unilateral provincial interference would be made much 
more difficult, if not impossible. A more even playing field will help return Toronto and Ontario 
to a relationship of co-operation and partnership. 
 
Benefits of a City Charter for Toronto 
 
A City Charter will empower the city of Toronto to face its future with new democratic and 
financial tools and without fear of provincial interference. 
 
 A constitutionally protected City Charter outlining the city’s authority, governance and 
taxation powers, amendable only with city consent, will lend the city status, stability and 
protection. 
 
 Strong local decision-making will put the city’s future in our own hands. Decision-makers will 
be accountable to city voters, not to voters from across the province. 
 
 The city will be free to consider new and innovative forms of government that can bolster 
public participation and decisions that reflect the diversity of the city, local values and urban 
aspirations. 
 
 The city will be free to innovate and find creative solutions to city issues, including 
congestion, density, affordability, livability and sustainability--without unnecessary provincial 
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permissions or fear of a provincial veto. 
 
 Stable, predictable, city-controlled, multi-year revenues will provide sufficient funds to pay for 
necessary programs and services and ensure that growth pays for growth. Access to 
progressive revenue sources that grow with the economy will restore balance and fairness to 
its financial relationship with the province. 
 
 Eliminating duplicate levels of approvals and achieving clarity over who makes decisions will 
be a significant benefit for the business community, which values regulatory simplicity and 
certainty. 
 
 Establishing clear jurisdictions and roles for both the city and the province    in municipal 
affairs will streamline decision-making and reduce duplication, unnecessary oversight and 
friction between governments. This will clear the decks for co-operation on matters of truly 
mutual interest. 
 
Cities Need Tools for the Future 
 
The people of Toronto have the brains, talent, ambition and love for the city to successfully run 
their own affairs. We are a diverse, wealthy, fast-growing city that strives to be confident, 
inclusive, innovative, modern and forward-looking. Toronto is a global city that competes 
internationally in such fields as culture, finance, sports, health sciences, manufacturing and 
technology. 
 
Our quality of life is among the highest in the world. In study after study, Toronto has been 
ranked among the top 10 global cities for safety, livability, cost of living, business environment, 
democracy, and food security. On a planet of increasing global mobility, Toronto is among the 
best at attracting the sophisticated, educated and innovative talent from around the world. 
Each year, the Greater Toronto Area welcomes and settles more than 100,000 newcomers—
refugees and immigrants alike—from other parts of the world seeking a better life. 
 
Toronto is an economic driver of Canada, contributing one-tenth of Canada’s GDP every year—
about $200 billion. Toronto recognizes that partnership with Ontario and Canada is vital to its 
success and embraces its responsibility to fairly share its wealth with its neighbouring cities, the 
province and the country. 
 
However, city taxpayers also contribute billions more tax dollars a year to the province than 
come back in contributions to the city’s budget. 
 
It’s estimated that in Canada, cities typically keep a mere 10 per cent of the taxes paid by city 
residents. The rest goes to senior levels of government. Contributions from those levels of 
government often come with strings attached that do not allow the city to do what it thinks is 
best. 
 
Toronto needs new arrangements in order to succeed: 
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 Clear jurisdiction and authority over city affairs 
 Control of revenues sufficient to meet the city’s needs 




1 The city and the province should, through public consultation, negotiation and joint 
legislation, create a City Charter for the Toronto which: 
 
Creates a more equal relationship between the city and the province, empowers local 
democracy and protects the city from undue provincial interference in city affairs. 
 
Establishes exclusive city jurisdiction, and removes provincial oversight, over all municipal 
functions not specifically allocated to the province, including city  
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governance, land use planning and appeals, streets, housing, local transit, public health, and 
education up to Grade 12. 
 
Establishes clear roles for the city, province and federal government, including protected 
funding arrangements, in areas of overlapping or shared jurisdiction such as health, human 
services (including social services and child care), immigrant settlement and policing. 
 
Establishes a new, stable fiscal regime whose aim is to give the city control of resources 
commensurate to its responsibilities, allowing Toronto to keep a greater share of the taxes 
currently paid by city residents to higher levels of government. It will give the city access to 
new, progressive revenue sources, such as income and sales tax, and to new financing tools 
such as municipal bonds. 
 
2 The province and the federal government should enact a single-province amendment under 
Section 43 of the Canadian Constitution that enables City Charter status for Toronto that 
requires the city’s consent for any changes to the Charter. 
 
The Charter Proposal 
 
For more than 30 years, there has been discussion about how cities in Canada can gain more 
authority and the powers and freedom necessary to govern their own affairs. 
 
City Charters from other jurisdictions have been suggested as models from which ideas might 
be taken – Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago, for example. California alone has more than 
100 Charter Cities with dedicated municipal powers, including the broad power of taxation, and 
a high level of autonomy from state governments. 
 
At different times, some Canadian cities have been given special powers by provincial 
legislation, but these special powers have been subject to limitations: the exercise of powers 
granted is subject to ongoing provincial approval and the province can unilaterally change or 
repeal those powers with no requirement to consult the city. 
 
Another issue is that many programs upon which cities depend are cost-shared with the 
provincial government. Whenever that government decides to reduce its share of funding, 
programs delivered at the municipal level suffer. Since city governments typically have very 
limited revenue powers, they are often unable to find the money to continue those programs 
and residents lose out. 
 
Our Charter proposal attempts to overcome those limitations in three ways. 
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Second, we propose a constitutional amendment to protect the powers and arrangements 
contained in the Charter. 
 
Third, we propose entrenching some permanent funding arrangements in the Charter. 
 
A City Charter is essentially an agreement between the city and the provincial government 
outlining the powers and authorities of the city, some of which are exclusive to the city and 
some of which are shared with the province. 
 





The City of Toronto Act (2006) gave the city the power to establish its own form of governance, 
subject to review by the Ontario Municipal Board. The province revoked that power in 2018 
with legislation that unilaterally reduced the number of city councilors from 47 to 25, in 
addition to changing the ward system.  
 
A Charter should restore those powers to the city and remove the provincial power of review. 
To ensure that City Council is not self-serving in setting out forms and structures and that the 
public interest is primary, Council decisions on governance should be reviewed by an 
independent agency appointed by City Council. 
 
3 The city should have the power to adopt decision-making procedures and structures that 
ensure fair representation of the many diverse voices, minorities, and communities in the city, 
which enhance residents’ involvement in decisions about their communities, and which 
enshrine and enact principles of equity. 
 
4 The city should have the exclusive authority to decide the form and structure of its 
government, including the composition of city council and ward boundaries, the mayor’s office, 
the city bureaucracy, agencies, boards and commissions, community councils, and other 
such bodies as it finds appropriate. Council should have the power to decide on approval 
mechanisms, including innovative ones designed to enhance citizen involvement, such as 
deliberative democracy and referendums. 
 
5 An independent, city-appointed body should review changes to the ward system. Its decision, 
after a fair hearing, will be reported to Council for a final determination. City Council should be 
given the exclusive authority to establish and fund this independent body. 
 
6 The city should have the exclusive authority to conduct municipal elections, including 
regulation of campaign donations and finance, voting age and eligibility, including the ability 
to extend the vote to residents who are not citizens. Again, these rules should be subject to 
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7 The city should have broad powers to pass bylaws respecting all aspects of city life, and 
establish penalties for contraventions. 
 
8 The city should be required to establish an effective integrity and accountability regime 
including a Members Code of Conduct, an Integrity Commissioner, Auditor General, Lobbyist 
Registry, and Ombudsman. 
 
9 The city should be permitted to delegate decision-making, including quasi- judicial  
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and legislative functions, to committees of council, staff, boards, community councils and 
other such bodies it thinks appropriate. 
 
10 The city should work and co-operate with many other governments. It should be authorized 
to exercise any of its powers or perform any of its functions and may participate in the 
financing of its efforts, jointly or in cooperation, by contract or otherwise, with one or more 
other municipalities, regions, other governmental bodies, the Province of Ontario and the 
government of Canada. 
 
B. Constitutional Protection 
 
The key to the adoption of any City Charter is constitutional protection. Without such 
protection, Toronto will continue to be at the mercy of provincial whim. 
A City Charter that is merely provincial legislation, such as the City of Toronto Act, can be 
amended or revoked unilaterally by any provincial government, without notice to, consultation 
with, or agreement of the city. 
 
It would be pointless for Toronto to do the considerable work necessary to negotiate and 
implement long-term powers, authority and funding arrangements if they are not then 
protected from the arbitrary actions of a more senior level of government. A deal that can be 
revoked by one party is no deal at all. 
 
In order to protect and guarantee the City Charter, we propose a single-province amendment 
to the Canadian Constitution that  would: 
 
 Enable the creation of Charter Cities in Ontario 
 Spell out the rules for amending any such Charter in the future 
 Guarantee that changes can only be made with the consent of the city. 
 
A single-province amendment, in this case applying only to Ontario, requires only the consent 
of the Ontario legislature and the federal parliament. 
 
How It Would Work 
 
Any Ontario city could request to negotiate a Charter with the province. The province would be 
required to enter into such negotiations in good faith and, once a deal is reached, it would be 
required to pass the necessary legislation to make it so. The resulting City Charter would be 
amendable only by agreement of the city. 
A single-province amendment to the Canadian Constitution (under Section 43) is the proposed 
vehicle to achieve this protection. 
 
There have been seven single-province amendments to the Constitution since it was adopted in 
1982. Newfoundland passed one in 1997 to establish a secular school system. The same year, 
Quebec established a language-based school system through a Section 43 amendment. New 
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Brunswick passed one in 1993 to establish equality between the province’s French and English-
speaking communities. 
 
Wording of the Amendment 
 
This proposal does not suggest wording for such an amendment. Constitutional scholars differ 
on the best way to enshrine protection for a City Charter and they should be consulted on the 
best approach to achieve the principles outlined here. 
 
However, we believe it’s important that the City Charter itself not be entrenched in the 
Constitution. Doing so would mean any Charter change would be a constitutional change, 
involving the provincial and federal governments, but not the city. Putting the Charter in the 
constitution would in effect double the number of senior governments whose permission 
 
Toronto would need to change its own Charter 
 
Leaving the Charter as a freestanding document, protected by but not part of the Constitution, 
provides greater flexibility. Within existing city jurisdiction, Toronto could change the Charter 
on its own. For changes that alter the relationship between the province and the city, both 
sides would need to agree to such changes. 
 
Some City Charters, such as the one adopted by Los Angeles, allow changes only through 
majority vote of city residents in a referendum. This additional level of Charter protection is 
somewhat foreign to the Canadian practice, but it could be considered, as a way to ensure 
voters agree to any change, as a way for a sufficient number of citizens to themselves propose a 




It’s important to note that no constitutional arrangement can be one hundred percent effective 
at protecting cities from a province determined to interfere. A provincial government, with a 
compliant federal government, could ultimately override the City Charter through a new 
amendment to the constitution. But this would take time, and give the city the opportunity to 
mount a defence. Provincial and federal governments that conspire to thwart the will of a 
major Canadian city might pay such a political price that this avenue would be confined to 
infrequent use or never be used at all. 
 
As has become very clear over the past year, the current constitutional arrangement, whereby 
cities are mere “creatures of the province” without any innate authority of their own, has left 
Toronto at an unacceptable disadvantage. 
 
While Canada’s constitutional rules do not allow for cities to gain co-equal status with a 
province, a City Charter with constitutional protection would give cities an immeasurably more 
powerful voice and status in any discussion of municipal affairs. 
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C. Powers and Authority 
 
This section outlines the powers and authorities that seem appropriate for the city of Toronto. 
This is a draft set of proposals and can be changed and amended as public discussion proceeds. 
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The powers outlined in the Charter should be interpreted broadly, not in a limited fashion. The 
powers may be exercised by the city without provincial approval. 
 
11 All powers given to the city in the Charter should be subject to all provincial and federal 
legislation of general province-wide application. However, if that legislation is contrary to the 
City Charter, the Charter should prevail. The city should be entitled with its own funds to 
increase or enhance any standards set by the province or the federal government. 
 
12 The Charter should clearly define the jurisdictions in which the city acts exclusively, without 
provincial oversight or approval. It should clarify the roles of the city and province in shared 
jurisdictions where both parties co-operate and each contributes resources. 
 
13 The city should continue to have all powers set out in the City of Toronto Act (and any other 
applicable legislation). Where there is a conflict between that legislation and the City Charter, 
the Charter should prevail. Where powers over any aspect of the municipal sphere has never 
been allocated to either government, particularly if the subject is new or not previously 
contemplated (an example might be ride-sharing), the city should be permitted to exercise the 
powers it deems appropriate to address the matter without a specific amendment to the 
Charter. 
 
14 Generally, any matter within the municipal sphere of activities that is not allocated to the 
province in the Charter, should be deemed to be the exclusive jurisdiction of the city. As a 
starting point, jurisdictions already allotted to the city under the City of Toronto Act (for 
example: Parks and Recreation, Water and Waste Services, Parking, Municipal Licenses and 
Standards, Economic Development, Urban Forestry) should formally become the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the city not subject to provincial oversight, override or repeal. 
 
15 In addition, the city should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over: City Governance, Land Use 
Planning, Streets, Housing, Local Transit and Education. 
 
16 Where the city exercises shared jurisdiction over certain areas with the province, such as 
Health, Human Services (including Child Care and Social Services), Immigrant Settlement 
and Policing, the roles of the respective players and funding arrangements should be clearly 
defined. 
 
17 There are bound to be disputes about the meaning of some sections of the Charter, or about 
activities of the province or the city, to which either party may object. 
 
18 The Charter should define a dispute resolution process. If the disagreement persists, the 
parties should resort not to the courts, but to the Arbitration Act, which sets out a fair process 
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EXCLUSIVE CITY JURISDICTION 
 
Land Use Planning 
 
Land use planning concerns all aspects of property development – rezoning, Official Plans, land 
severance, committee of adjustment and others. Currently, most land use matters require 
approval by a provincial body, so that City Council is not in the position of being able to make 
final decisions. Ontario is one of the few provinces that does not allocate land use 
responsibilities solely to municipalities. 
19 The city should have the exclusive power to deny, approve, or place restrictions on any land 
use planning application including Official Plans, zoning and rezoning, subdivisions, minor 
and major variances, and severance consents, without requiring the approval of any 
provincial   body. 
 
20 To ensure Council decisions are appropriate and in keeping with the public interest, land use 
decisions should be reviewed by an independent, city- appointed body and its decision, after 
a fair hearing, will be reported to Council for a final determination. The city should be given 
the authority to establish and fund such an independent body. 
 
21 The city should be given the exclusive authority to establish and enforce development and 
intensification conditions such as minimum and maximum densities, heights, development 
charges, brown-field development goals, and controls to protect heritage and cultural 




Many of the regulations and restrictions the city wishes to place on streets – stoplights, or the 
use of traffic wardens, for example – require provincial approval. This creates unnecessary 
duplication and expense and there’s no reason to think that provincial officials would have a 
better handle on local traffic conditions than local officials. 
 
22 The city should have the exclusive power to regulate the sidewalks, lanes, bicycle lanes, 
streets, roadways and non-provincial highways within its boundaries, including road design and 
construction, speed limits, traffic calming, congestion and climate change strategies, signals and 




The city has a great interest in housing supply and conditions, including temporary housing, 
housing the homeless, social and affordable housing, and rental housing. It’s not clear that the 
city currently has the power to exercise control over all these matters. The funding of social and 
affordable housing can be done through cost sharing programs or, preferably, when the city 
secures the needed revenue tools, through its own financial resources.    
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23 The city should have the exclusive power to provide and regulate affordable and social 
housing, including setting rent/income levels. 
 
24 The city should have the power to enter into cost-sharing arrangements with private and 
public agencies, other municipalities, Ontario and Canada for the provision of social and 
affordable housing. 
 
25 The city should have the power to enter into agreements, including loans and mortgages, 
with various parties regarding the provision of social and affordable housing and to require 
certain levels of social and affordable housing be achieved in developments. 
 
26 The city should have the exclusive authority to provide temporary housing 
accommodation for immigrants and refugees, and for the homeless. 
 
27 The city should have the authority to control the demolition and conversion of rental 





Since the early 1920s, the city has always been a leader in public transit serving city and 
neighbouring residents. In the late 1940s it undertook the construction of Canada’s first subway 
without provincial subsidies, using the surpluses produced by the transit system during the 
Second World War. Transit fares provide the majority of the Toronto Transit Commission’s 
revenue base, unlike other North American cities, which receive much higher levels of 
government subsidies. Despite the lack of support, the TTC has often been voted the best 
transit system in North America, an accolade bestowed as recently as 2017. 
 
Funding problems have hobbled the transit system since it was expanded to serve the lower 
density suburban areas of Metro Toronto from the mid-1970s. At that time, the city was 
supported by provincial subsidies for both operating and capital expenditures. But those 
arrangements meant the province had a major say in how transit would be structured and 
designed in the city, and often their demands did not advance the cause of good public transit 
or reflect Toronto’s priorities. 
 
More recently, the province has decided that it will take over parts of the transit system. 
Serious questions have been asked about what the province’s plans entail and whether this 
change will be of any benefit to transit riders in the city. The system today integrates subways, 
buses, streetcars and LRTs into a fully integrated network, providing advantages that could be 
lost if the system were to be split between multiple owners. 
 
The best people to decide Toronto’s transit needs are transit users, city officials and city 
politicians accountable to city voters, not provincial officials and politicians, many of whom do 
not live in Toronto or use the TTC. 
 
28 The city should have the exclusive authority to provide and regulate public transit in the 
156
Sewell: Toward City Charters in Canada
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021
city. This should include Wheel-Trans, buses, streetcars, light rail, transit, subways, 
other transit conveyances and ancillary properties including Union Station (which the city 
owns.) 
29 The city should have the authority to enter into agreements with other municipalities  
and/or transit agencies in the GTA, the province and Canada to provide and improve 




Health policy and spending are matter of great importance to governments, particularly local 
governments. The Romanow Commission in 2002 recommended that much more attention be 
given to preventing illness and injury in order to reduce the need for hospitals and emergency 
medical treatments. The province has made moves to provide a more local health focus by 
coordinating services at the local level and strengthening local decision-making through the 
Local Health Initiative Network (LHINs). 
 
LHINs were given control over all health expenditures at the local level, including hospitals, and 
were governed by provincially appointed boards. The province is now moving back to a more 
centralized health governance system without important local input and decision- making. The 
province has also announced its intention to substantially reduce allocations to public health 
matters, even though a robust public health system is thought to be the optimal way to contain 
health expenditures through improving social factors that lead to good health outcomes. 
 
It is recognized that some health matters involve shared jurisdictions in decision-making and 
expenditures. It is also recognized that Toronto houses health facilities that serve the entire 
province and that jurisdictional arrangements must reflect this reality. 
 
The city should have exclusive powers and functions similar to those granted to a Local Heath 
Integration Network. 
 
30 The city should have the authority to enter into agreements with the province for coordinating 
health issues and spending within the city. 
 




Until 20 years ago, education in the city was entirely funded from the property tax system, 
giving local school boards considerable flexibility in creating and operating programs to educate 
children within the city. The provincial government then took over all responsibility for funding 
education by seizing the property tax allocation for education purposes. 
 
The result has been a provincial standardization of services and funding which has not served 
the city well: schools are falling into disrepair, and surplus school properties are not readily 
available for community purposes. Programs the school boards would like to fund are often 
cancelled when school boards are unable to find the needed money. The province dictates class 
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sizes that are often seen as inappropriate. Trustees are grossly underpaid for their work. The 
city needs to regain control of its education system. 
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32 Education responsibilities, including funding and property tax allocations for education, 
should be in the exclusive control of the city and local school boards. This should apply to 
pre-school, primary school and secondary school matters. 
 
33 Local school boards should have the exclusive authority to determine the governance 
structure and elections of its boards. To ensure those decisions are appropriate and in 
keeping with the public interest, they should be reviewed by an independent, city-appointed 
body established and appointed by the boards and its decision, after a fair hearing, will be 
reported to the boards for a final determination. The boards should be given the authority to 
establish and fund such an independent body. 
 
34 Pooling of equalization payments from Toronto’s property tax base for education purposes at 
the provincial level will be a matter of agreement between local boards, the city, and the 







More than one quarter of children in Toronto live in poverty. There is a serious income 
distribution problem occurring it the city. Responsibility for poverty-related issues is shared 
between the provincial and the federal governments, with the city playing a crucial role in 
delivering, and sometimes sharing in the cost of, programs that it has no role in developing. 
 
For instance, monthly payments may be appropriate for other municipalities in Ontario, but are 
much too low to meet the higher cost of living in Toronto.  Current arrangements are 
necessarily complex and can result in people falling through the cracks and leaving families 
impoverished. The most vulnerable were further disadvantaged when the provincial 
government unilaterally decided to reduce welfare benefits. 
 
The city is in the best position to provide human services at the local level in order to ensure 
that programs are adequately funded, supported, and coordinated. It is recognized some 
human services may involve shared decision-making and shared expenditures. 
 
35 The city should have exclusive jurisdiction of all social services and childcare programs in 
Toronto. 
 
36 The city will require funding support for these services. It needs to ensure such funding is 
not arbitrarily reduced. This can occur in one of two ways: 
 
i. Through the city receiving block funding from the federal and provincial 
governments equal to the amount spent on those programs in Toronto, to be increased 
annually according to some fair formula, for example, based upon cost of living 
increases; or 
 
ii. Through the province determining the amount currently being transferred to the 
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city for these programs, establishing that amount as a municipal revenue source 
representing a percentage of annual provincial revenue collected by the province, and 
transferring it annually to the city. 
 
Immigrant and Refugee Settlement 
 
More than 75 per cent of the immigrants and refugees coming to Ontario between 2011 and 
2016 settled in the Toronto area. As Toronto City Council recently learned, it does not have the 
resources to ensure that they are adequately housed. There are also strains on programs 
related to teaching English as a Second Language, job training, and as well as other 
resettlement needs. 
 
Successful immigrant settlement is important to the health and vibrancy of the city. It is 
recognized that these activities involve shared decision-making and shared funding. Given that 
the city already plays a large role in providing many of the services required by newcomers, 
such as housing, social assistance and counseling, it makes sense for the city to be the lead and 
coordinating agency for newcomer settlement. 
 
37 The city should have the power to enter into agreements with the provincial source 
representing a percentage of annual provincial revenue collected by the province, and 
transferring it annually to the city. 
 
38 The city must be involved with the provincial and federal governments in discussions about 
immigration, refugee levels and resettlement strategies. 
 
Police and Security 
 
Police governance in Toronto is provided by the Toronto Police Service Board (the size of which 
is constrained by provincial legislation) which sets how members will be appointed. The seven-
member board has three members appointed by the province. A larger police board would 
allow for much more diversity in police management and decision-making. 
The province makes some small grants for specific policing matters, but almost the entire one 
billion dollar annual police budget is funded from city sources. Policing involves shared 
responsibilities between the city and the province through the provincial Police Services Act.  
 
In the interests of ensuring independent oversight of Toronto’s police force, the province 
should continue to play its role in providing such oversight through such institutions as the 
Special Investigations Unit and the Office of the Independent Police Review Director. 
 
39 The city should have exclusive power to determine the structure and size of the Police 
Services Board, including how members are appointed, while ensuring that the province may 
appoint one-third of the members of the board. 
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Toronto recognizes that, as a strong generator and beneficiary of economic wealth, it has a 
responsibility to contribute its financial fair share to Ontario and Canada. Unfortunately, the 
current situation is not sustainable: with Toronto having access to only about 10 per cent of the 
taxes it sends to the two senior levels of government. 
 
Given that imbalance, and the public’s resistance to the introduction of new taxes, it is not 
enough to say Toronto should use the few revenue tools available to it under the City of 
Toronto Act. Such revenue tools are not progressive and simply cannot raise the amount of 
money required. 
 
A greater share of existing taxation should accrue to Toronto as dedicated, Charter-protected 
municipal revenues. Toronto’s share of these taxes should be commensurate with the city’s 
contribution to Ontario and Canada and with the true cost of providing the programs and 
services as required by law. The city should control (not just be given or have access to) 
sufficient revenue to properly fund programs and services within its jurisdiction. 
 
Toronto should also have control of sufficient revenue to properly fund its share of shared 
programs and services. Such an arrangement would provide stable, predictable revenue and 
reduce the friction of continually negotiating levels of funding, which fluctuate from 
government to government. To prevent duplication, the city could piggyback onto current 
provincial collection systems. 
 
Time and again, Toronto has been deprived of important sources of revenue while expectations 
of service delivery at the local level have increased substantially.  
 
Until 1936, when the province passed the Income Tax Act, Toronto and other Ontario 
municipalities had statutory authority to levy income taxes. Until 1944, Toronto had the 
authority to levy corporate taxes. In both cases, when the province removed these authorities, 
the city was paid a lump sum in compensation. Given current realities it now seems reasonable 
that these authorities be returned to the city. 
 
Until the creation of the so-called megacity 20 years ago, the city had control of all the revenue 
produced by the property tax system, funding both city and Board of Education expenditures.  
 
When the province took over the education system, it seized control of about half the city’s 
property taxes for education funding purposes. 
 
The province also has control over many aspects of the property tax system including 
assessment and the burdens placed on different classes of property, taking much of the 
important decision-making about property taxes out of the hands of the city. The negative 
results of this are now being felt by many of Toronto’s property owners. 
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It is important that in the case of shared cost arrangements, the city be protected from 
unilateral provincial decisions reducing such payments. 
40 The city should have direct access to existing progressive revenue sources that grow with the 
economy, taxes such as sales and income tax to be spent at the discretion of the city. The city 
should be given a dedicated portion of these existing taxes commensurate to current 
provincial contributions to the city’s operating budget and the power to levy its own additional 
sales and income taxes if necessary. 
 
41 The city should be given full control of the property tax system including the power to 
establish assessments, classes of property, and apportionment of tax burdens to different 
classes of property (such as to protect small business.) The city should control all property 
taxes raised in the city. 
 
42 Responsibilities or expenditures should only be downloaded to the city from the province with 
the consent of the city, after adequate notice has been given in the budget cycle and 
revenues are transferred to city control sufficient to offset any additional costs to the city. 
 
43 Arrangements for the funding of shared responsibilities must be worked out. The city could 
receive block funding from the federal and provincial governments equal to the amount spent 
on those programs in Toronto, increased annually according to some fair formula based 
upon, perhaps, increases in the cost of living. 
 
Or the province could determine the amount transferred to the city for these programs and 
establish it as a municipal revenue source representing a percentage of annual provincial 
revenue collected by the province, and transfer it annually to the city. 
 
No matter the form such funding arrangements take, it is essential that these revenues be 
stable, predictable, and permanent arrangements that can be changed or revoked only with the 




Currently the city requires provincial approval to borrow money, a duplication of effort that is 
time consuming and costly. As well, some other financial matters require provincial approval. 
 
44 The city should have exclusive authority to manage its financial affairs, including borrowing 
funds, budgeting for a short-term deficit, and tax increment financing with respect to property 
taxation. 
 
45 The city should have the ability to use new financial tools, including self- financing powers 
such as municipal bonds, as required. 
 
E. Access, Equity, and Inclusion 
 
One of the extraordinary characteristics of Toronto is its diversity. And while it is remarkable 
that generally this incredible mélange of people lives together in relative harmony, many 
systemic inequities and structural barriers exist. Racism and other forms of systemic 
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discrimination that exist in our city rob members of marginalized communities of their 
opportunity to live a healthy, safe and fulfilling life. 
 
City Council must have the power and authority to address these issues, to help dismantle all 
forms of systemic discrimination and remove barriers for all people. This includes the 
challenges resulting from the cultural genocide of Indigenous peoples over many years, the 
racism faced by African Canadians and other people of colour, and the intersecting 
discrimination faced by women, people with disabilities, people of Islamic and other faiths, 
immigrants, refugees, LGBTQ++ people and others with precarious status.  
These marginalized communities experience a much higher rate of poverty than the general 
population, with some communities being six times more likely than white Torontonians to live 
in poverty. 
 
46 The City should formally acknowledge the deep-rooted history and present-day realities of 
colonialism and racism. 
 
47 The City should adopt a racial equity lens and gender based equity analysis to develop, 
design, and evaluate all of its by-laws, policies, programs and services. 
 
48 The City should require all of its departments to collect and use disaggregated data (on the 
basis of race and other demographics) to measure the impact of all of its policies, programs 
and services on diverse and vulnerable communities, and create appropriate transparency 
and accountability measures within each department to ensure full compliance with an 
Access, Equity and Inclusion Framework. 
 
49 The City should actively communicate the Access, Equity and Inclusion Framework with the 
public and engage in ongoing and meaningful consultation with equity seeking groups to 
monitor the implementation of the Framework. 
 
50 The City should ensure that it removes all barriers to its services on the basis of immigration 
status, and it should work with the province to remove such barriers to services that fall 
under their shared jurisdiction. 
 
51 The City should adopt an Employment Equity Policy to ensure its workforce is reflective of the 
city’s diversity. 
 
The Bigger Picture 
 
It has been noted that some city functions spill over Toronto’s boundaries into neighbouring 
municipalities  – transit, human services and the natural environment are three examples. This 
has highlighted a concern that a Charter for the city of Toronto alone is too limited. 
 
This proposal makes it clear that Toronto should have the ability to enter into agreements with 
other municipalities to deal with such issues. 
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There is currently no structure within the Greater Toronto Area capable of becoming a Charter 
City beyond the city’s boundaries – we have no choice but to work with the existing 
municipalities and their boundaries. Other municipalities may be interested in a Charter. This 
proposal could be a model on which they can build. 
 
Whether or not they opt to pursue Charter status, neighbouring municipalities should work 
closely together to ensure that the issues that cross over municipal boundaries are reasonably 
addressed. 
 
When Toronto secures a Charter, other cities in Ontario, indeed across Canada, can use 
Toronto’s example to secure a Charter for themselves. There is no reason that the adoption of a 
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